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Since its introduction more than half a century ago,
Lanchester's theory of combat has undergone considerable re-
vision and expansion. This thesis presents a consolidation
and a grouping by subject of the significant contributions
to this theory which have appeared in the literature in re-
cent years, with emphasis on the period since 1964, when a
thorough "state of the art" summary article was published by





I. INTRODUCTION AND CATEGORIZATION OF REFERENCES 4
II. THE ORIGINAL LANCHESTER FORMULATION 8
III. RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO LANCHESTER' S THEORY 11
A. GENERAL 11
B. HETEROGENEOUS FORCES 11
C. STOCHASTIC FORMULATIONS 13
D. OPERATIONAL LOSSES, REPLACEMENTS, AND MOVEMENT
OF FORCES 25
E. VERIFICATION STUDIES 29
F. INSURGENCY AND GUERRILLA WARFARE 34
G. THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING 39
H. DUELS AND INDIRECT FIRE 40
I. THE ROLE OF COMMAND EFFICIENCY AND INTELLIGENCE-- 40
J. THE ATTRITION COEFFICIENTS 42
K. ENGAGEMENTS PRECEEDED BY SEARCH AND DETECTION --- 44
L. FOLLOWING DOLANSKY'S SUGGESTIONS 46
M. SMALL COMBAT GROUPS AND WEAPONS WITH GREAT
EFFECTIVENESS 48
N. FORCE SIZES GROSSLY UNEQUAL 49
IV. COMMENTS 51
BIBLIOGRAPHY 5 3
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 58
FORM DD 147 3 59

I . INTRODUCTION AND CATEGORIZATION OF REFERENCES
Dynamic combat was first modeled explicity by F. W.
Lanchester [39] (although his work was anticipated by Rear
Admiral Bradley A. Fiske [20, 62]). Lanchester formulated a
battle between two forces in terms of a pair of simultaneous
differential equations which described the rate at which ecch
side's strength would be decreased. While his model emerged
as a significant contribution to a new field, it had limited
applicability because it was based on several simplifying tut
restricting assumptions. In the years that have passed since
the publication of Lanchester' s work, and particularly since
the early 1940 's when operations research came to the fore-
front as a tool for the military decision-maker, much has
been written on the subject of coirbat dynamics. Some authors
have challenged the applicability of the Lanchester equations
under any circumstances. Others have modified the assumptions
behind the original equations in order to use them as a pre-
dictive device for present and possible future combat situa-
tions, to include ambushes, guerrilla warfare, and the like.
Efforts have been made to determine from a given set of ini-
tial conditions the probability that one side or the other
will ultimately win. Additionally, the original deterministic
combat process has been formulated as a stochastic process.
The purpose of this thesis is to review the literature
on Lanchester' s theory of combat in an attempt to assemble in

one document, by subject, the numerous extensions of and
contributions to this theory which have been made through
the years. Emphasis is on the period since 1964, at which
time an extensive review was made by Dolansky [18].
Section II describes briefly Lanchester's original for-
mulation. In Section III, most of the significant contribu-
tions to Lanchester ' s theory uncovered during the research
for this thesis are described. Section IV contains a sum-
mary and a look at the future.
Two points must be kept in mind by the reader. First,
this thesis does not attempt to describe in detail every
article on Lanchester's theory which has ever appeared in the
literature. For example, work by Morse and Kimball, while
extensive, has been discussed by many authors over the years
in numerous articles. All these articles, and the original
works upon which they were based, are listed in the biblio-
graphy. Secondly, to avoid repetition, most of the detailed
descriptions which appear on the following pages are of work
which has- been done since Dolansky' s summary article was pub-
lished. As can be seen by a quick glance at the bibliography,
this six-year period represents a considerable number of ar-
ticles. It is hoped that with this thesis and Dolansky 's 1964
article in front of him, the interested analyst will have an
accurate picture of the state of the art of Lanchester's theory
of combat through mid- 1970.
A grouping of the articles by subject appears below as a
convenience to the reader. Many of the articles referenced

contain extensive bibliographies of their own, providing
more complete information on the subject under consideration.
Sub j ect Pertinent References
Amphibious Assaults 35
Attrition Coefficients 3, 5, 6, 7, 16, 21, 45
Before Lanchester 20, 62
Command Efficiency and Intelligence 49
Duels 5, 25
Force Sizes Grossly Unequal 26
General Theory and Summary Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 18,
23, 37, 42, 55, 57,
59, 60
Heterogeneous Forces 27, 30, 32, 53, 59
Indirect Fire 5, 61
Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare 17, 36, 50, 51
Logarithmic Law 46, 58
Mix of Linear Law and Square Law
.
17
Movement of Forces 4, 15, 23, 59
Operational Losses 2, 42.
Original Lanchester Formulation 39, 43
Prediction Without Enemy Information 14
Reconnaissance 9
Reinforcements 41
Small Combat Groups 59
Stochastic Determinism 11, 43, 63
Stochastic Formulations 10, 11, 12, 13, 27,










19, 22, 28, 29, 40,
44, 58, 59, 63
59
9, 12, 13, 31, 36,
52

II. THE ORIGINAL LANCHESTER FORMULATION
Lanchester's equations, now in existence for more than
50 years, represent a significant contribution to the art of
modeling the dynamics of military combat. Lanchester [39]
described the attrition of each side in a two-sided struggle
by means of a system of ordinary differential equations.
Beginning with three basic assumptions, he postulated two
types of attrition: the linear law and the square law. The
assumptions common to both theories were :
1. Two military forces (red and blue) are opposing each
other. On each side, every soldier is armed with the same
weapon. The attrition rate at which a single weapon of one
kills units of the other side may not be the same for each
side
.
2. Every weapon on each side can take under fire all
weapons of the opposing side.
3. The attrition rates for each side are known and do
not change for the duration of the engagement.
The linear law results under the circumstances where
each side is ignorant of the exact location of its opposition
but does have knowledge of the general area occupied (area
fire). Furthermore, as units of each side are destroyed,
the survivors distribute their fire uniformly over the area
occupied by the surviving opponents. With these additional








where dR is the rate at which the red force decreases in
dt
strength, A, is the constant attrition rate for force blue
(the rate at which a single blue unit kills red units) , and
B(t) and R(t) are the number of surviving blue and red units,
respectively, at time t. Similarly, dB is the rate at which
dT
the blue force decreases in strength and A , is the rate atfe rb
which a single red unit kills blue units.
Lanchester ' s square law is applicable in the situation
where eacli unit of both sides knows the precise location of
all surviving units of its enemy, so that as opponents are
eliminated, fire is immediately shifted to and uniformly dis-
tributed over all surviving units (aimed fire) . With this








where the symbols are as defined above.
If one accepts Lanchester's assumptions, his equations
are most A^aluable. From knowledge of the type fire employed
by each side (aimed fire or area fire) , the strength of each

side, and the rate at which each side inflicts casualties,
one can determine each side's strength at any time t by sol
ving two simultaneous differential equations.
10

III. RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO LANCHESTER'S THEORY
A. GENERAL
In recent years a considerable amount of research has
been done in Lanchester's theory, much of it obviously in-
spired by suggestions from Dolansky [18]. In this chapter,
this work is summarized, by category, in order to bring the
reader up-to-date on the current state of the art through
mid-1970.
B. HETEROGENEOUS FORCES
Lanchester's assumption of the homogeneity of forces en
each side is obviously not appropriate in modern warfare.
Seldom, if ever, again will a force operate on any battle-
field with only one type weapon. Work on the incorporation
into the model of different weapon types on each side is not
new (see Helmer [32], Snow [53], and Weiss [59]). Snow [53] crit
icized those who have attempted to fit the original Lanchester
equations to combat between mixed forces by assuming a linear
form. He pointed out that the assumption of a linear form
prohibits mutual support within each force. Clearly, mutual
support will be present, as, for example, when one side is
composed of tanks and infantry. A recent contribution which
considered heterogeneous forces was made by Helmbold [30].
Two heterogeneous forces opposed each other in a series of
volleys. Every firing unit on each side, regardless of type,
followed a predetermined plan of attack and did not adjust
11

its behavior as the situation changed. Helmbold assumed
that the probability that a given fire unit on one side sur-
vived fire from a given fire unit of the other side was in-
dependent of what all other fire units of the other side did.
Since each side followed a predetermined attack plan (rather
than changing its tactics as casualties were suffered by
both sides) , the model was less valid in the later stages of
battle. With the progress of the battle described as above,
Helmbold derived the following equations for the expected
number of weapons surviving each volley:
E[R.l = £ D EfS^] = Z D Q^L j J reR L r J reR x r ,
and
E[B.] = ,Z B E[S-h = ,E C ?l .L
j
J beB L b J beB b
In the above equations, E[R.] and E[B.] represent the expected
number of weapons on the red and blue sides, respectively,
which survive volley j ; S-* is defined to be one if fire unit
r survives volley j, and zero, otherwise (similarly for S?)
;
Qj is defined as the probability that S-* = 1 (similarly for
Pp) . Q-* is calculated from the following formula: Qr, =
Q-1
, ITR (
i_clv. ) > where q? - the probability that fire unit
beB kills fire unit reR during volley j . (An analogous ex-
pression existed for Pp.) While the results which Helmbold'
s
equations yielded would be invaluable to any commander, these
results depended entirely on a set of probabilities which




Perhaps the most extensive work done with Lanchester 's
equations has centered on the reformulation of the problem
in stochastic form. The original Lanchester equations were
deterministic; that is, they predicted annihilation of one
side or the other at some precise moment in the future, and
yielded the same results every time for the same parameters.
Clearly, such an approach was not in accordance with reality.
But, Lanchester ' s deterministic equations could be considered
as an expected value formulation of combat, and thus could be
derived by taking expected values of the underlying probability
distributions. Early work in stochastic formulations was done
by B. 0. Koopman [37] during World War II. Other pioneers in
this field were Snow [53] and Morse and Kimball [43], In the
paragraphs which follow, several irore recent stochastic for-
mulations are described. Each of the authors whose work is
outlined assumed that combat proceeds according to a Markov
process (no dependence on past history) and that the process
is stationary (that which happens during any time interval
from t to t+At depends upon the state of the two forces at
time t, and upon the time length, At, but is independent of
the time, t, at which the interval begins).
Brown [12] described two-sided combat as a Markov sto-
chastic process characterized by the initial state of the
system (strengths of each side) and two functions, $ and a.
13

He assumed that a system in state (r,b) at the beginning of
any short time interval of length t could do one of three
things during that time interval. It could remain in state
(r,b) (no casualties on either side); it could go to (r,b-l)
(one casualty on the blue side and none on the red side) ; or it
could go to (r-l,b) (one casualty on the red side and none
on the blue side). Thus, the time intervals were chosen tc
be short enough such that it was impossible for either side
to lose more than one man or for each side to lose one man in
any interval. In Brown's model, e v ' J was used as the
probability that the system remains in state (r,b) throughout
a time interval of length t, where x(r,b) is the expected
duration of the system in state (r,b). <p was defined as
l/r(r,b). a(r,b) was taken as the probability that the sys-
tem goes from (r,b) to (r,b-l) in one At time interval, whi le
3(r,b) was the probability that the system goes from (r,b) to
(r-l,b) in one At time interval.
Two questions which a stochastic formulation of combat
usually addresses are the probability that a particular side
will win the battle and the probability that, given some ini-
tial state (r,b), the system will be in some other state
(ri,bi) after some time T. Brown showed that the probability
that the red side wins, P(r,b) satisfies the difference
equation
,




He went on to show that
P(ri,b x ,T;r,b) - k |j Pk (ri ,bi ;r,b) G,(r x ,bi ,T;r ,b)
,
r,b
where I , is the set of feasible transition paths,
r ,b f y
P, (r i ,b i ; r ,b) is the probability that the system goes from




,T ;r ,b) is the
probability that if a system travels path k, it will be at
(ri,bi) at time T if it started at (r,b). As was pointed out
in the paper, G, is very difficult to compute if r+b is at
all large. Brown did not attempt an exact solution to the
difference equation for P(r,b), but he did derive a close ap-
proximation to a solution. It is wise to state explicitly
before considering the next approach to stochastic Lanchester
theory that fundamental to Brown's work was the assumption
that r(t) and b(t), the number of survivors on each side at
time t, were random variables, not completely determined be-
forehand .
Another stochastic model which used reasoning very simi-
lar to that employed by Brown was developed by Bram [10]. Al-
though he' used a different scenario, Bram' s -model differed
from the one described above only in that Bram permitted a
transition from (r,b) to (r-l,b-l) to occur with positive prob-
ability. In Bram's model, two naval forces opposed each other.
On one side were r aircraft carriers (supported by escort forces
and general ASW forces). On the other side were b submarines.
The carriers were in an area attempting to accomplish a sepa-
rate mission (search rate was S ) . The submarines had thev
s^
mission of seeking and destroying the carriers (search rate
15

was S ) . At time t there were i carriers and j submarines
in the area of operations. The model assumed that submarines
could kill only carriers and that submarines were killed by
escort forces and general ASW forces. The question Bram ad-
dressed was the determination of P (i
, j , t ; r ,b) . He defined
c = if the carrier was not killed in an encounter, and
c = 1 if the carrier was killed (similarly, s = and s = 1
for similar circumstances for the submarine) . From these








could occur as possible values for P , where, for example,
P
n
, was the probability that in an encounter, the carrier
survived and the submarine was killed. K was defined as
g
the probability that a submarine was killed by ASW, given
that it was detected by ASW. With these assumptions, Bram
derived expressions for each of the four possible transition
probabilities. In the interest of brevity, only the first
of these will be described in detail'. If the system was in
state (i,j+l) at time t and in state (i,j) at time t+At, that
implied that a submarine was killed. This could have happened
in two ways: either' the submarine was detected and killed
by ASW (which occurred with probability S K At(j+1)), or
5 g
there was an encounter with a carrier in which the carrier
survived and the submarine was killed (which occurred with
probability S (i) (j +1) AtP Q1 ) . Thus,


















< P 01 +P 10* P 11>J
P(i,j,t+At;i+l,j+l) = S
c
(i + l)(j + l)AtP 11
Since these four transition probabilities are mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive, P(i ,j,t + At) is equal to their sum. Bram
showed that one could solve for P(i,j,t+At) by taking its
derivative with respect to time anl specifying the initial
conditions that P u (0) = 1 and P. .(0) = 0. From its solu-r,b v J i»J
tion he calculated E[i(t)], the expected number of red sur-
v y
vivors at time t as being equal to . . iP.
.
(t) (similarly for
E[j(t)]). In order to solve for q(t), the probability that
a carrier survives to time t, Bram noted that q(t) is exactly
equal to — E[i(t)]. He then developed two approximate ex-
ponential forms for q(t), both of which were shown to be good
approximations for the four cases examined. These expressions
are :
q(t) s exp b(D-A)-0.0568r(D-B)K+0.6222r(D-B) 1-e
t(k+0.6222r(D-B) ,1
and

















D = A+B+C, and
K = S K .
s g
Robertson [48] developed a scenario for a probabilistic
approach to Lanchester's theory which had eight defenders op-
posing nine attackers. The model did not allow for inter-
visibility. On each of a series of volleys, every defender
chose an attacker at random. The eight defenders fired si-
multaneously (eight shots per volley) . At the conclusion of
each volley there existed a set of probabilities that
0,1,..., 9 attackers had survived that volley. For example,
the probability that five attackers survived a volley is the
probability that four shots hit four attackers + the proba-
bility that five shots hit four attackers +...+ the proba-
bility that eight shots hit four attackers (Robertson assumed
that an attacker was killed when hit) . These sets of proba-
bilities, when grouped as a sequence, formed a Markov chain
which was. the basis of weapon comparisons. With the Markovian
nature of the process having been demonstrated, Robertson gave












are fired on the n~ volley),k n
where t is the number of attackers surviving the n volley.
The above expression applied only in the case where the hit
probability was the same for all shots.

Helmbold [27] extended Robertson's basic model and put
it in a more general framework to allow for intervisibility
effects and differences between weapons. He then developed
a series of discrete approximations to the expected number
of attackers surviving a given volley. To allow for inter-
visibility limitations, V-5 (n) was defined as the probability
that m targets are visible at the start of the n volley,
given that j targets are alive at the start of that volley.
Then,
P?(s,n) = E n P
m
f . ,(s,n)V^(n),i v ' J m=0 i-(j-m) v ' * m v Ji
where P. , . ,,(s,n) V*' (n) is the probability that (j-m) tar-l- ( j -m) K ' J m y J r J <J J
gets are not visible (and must, therefore, survive that vol-
ley) multiplied by the probability that [i-(j-m)] of the
visible targets survive that volley (for a total of i surviv-
ing targets). Helmbold' s expression for P. (s,n), with inter-
visibility considered, was thus analogous to Robertson's
transition probability formula when intervisibility was ig-
nored. Helmbold went on to point out the inefficient results
which would arise if the defenders fired at only a subset of
the attacking force, thereby increasing the chances of multi-
ple hits on a single target.
In the material which follows on the determination of
the expected number of attackers surviving a given volley,
it was assumed that all attackers are visible to the defenders.
Prior to deriving by several methods the approximate
expected number of attackers surviving a given volley, Helmbold
19

pointed out that this number could be computed exactly from
the distribution of t
,
but that such calculations were not
easily done. His first approximation was a modification of
an approximation which Robertson used. Robertson had as-
sumed that, the defenders' fire on each volley is uniformly
distributed over the original number of attackers. As was
reasonable, Helmbold argued that since the defenders see all
surviving attackers, fire will be distributed only over these
attackers who have not been killed. He showed that E[t ,,11 n + l J






where p, - the probability that the k shot on the n vol-
ley is a hit. In the special case where each volley con-
sisted of a single shot,
n s
T * T - E, ,E, P, '.
n o r=l k=l k
In the situation where the battle terminated after the shots
of the first volley,
r=n k=s ,
n o r-1 k=0 K T k J
o
This result was further simplified to






"IT rfil k^O Pn
o
)
under conditions which permit approximation of a binonial ran-
dom variable by a Poisson random variable (this was called the
20

single volley Poisson approximation) . Two final approxima-
tions made by Helmbold were the expected value approximation
and its Poisson counterpart. In the former, the value of tF ' n
was approximated by its conditional expectation, which could




« T ,11, (1~ Pi ) .n + 1 n k=l v 1 *k 7
n
The result obtained in the Poisson expected value approach
was that
( 1 S r, /
T J._ « T exp \ - ~ , Z, p V .n+1 n l [ T k=l 1 k
V n )
Helmbold made an extensive comparative analysis of the
above approximations , from which he concluded that the ex-
pected value approximation yielded results which were closest
to the exact values for the widest range of parameter choices,
Robertson [48] also considered a continuous analog to
her original model in which h was taken as the time interval
between firings. The number of shots fired per volley, s,
equaled wrh, where w is the number of active weapons in the
force and r is the number of shots fired per weapon per unit
time. She showed that T'(t), the derivative of the number of




-wrp(t)T(t)^, where p(t) = - ,£., Pr. Helmbold's modifica-
o
tion simplified this to T'(t) = -wrp(t).
Dolansky [18] cited that Brown [13] had worked on the
problem of determining the probability of winning in a sto-





the probability that the red side wins, equaled
A(r ,b)P(r ,b-l) + [1-A(r ,b) ]P(r-l ,b) , where A(r,b) is the
probability that at any given time the next casualty will
occur on the red side. As is so often the case, the precise
solution for P(r,b) was difficult to compute. Thus, in ad-
dition to specifying its exact form for both the linear law
(when A(r,b) is a constant) and tha square law (when A(r,b)=
er(er+b) and e is a ratio of relative effectiveness of red
to blue), Brown derived several approximate solutions.
A recent stochastic formulation by Marshall [41] treated
the problem of permitting each side to receive replacements.
It will be; recalled that one of Lanchester's simplifying as-
sumptions was that a force would never increase in strength
as the battle progressed. Marshall formulated the problem
as a two-dimensional random walk with boundaries. He assumed
that when r=R, the red side could never receive replacements
(similarly when b=B) and that combat' ended with b winning
when r = , or with r winning when b = 0. At any instant in
time, the point (r,b) could do any one of five things: it
could remain unchanged or it could go to (r+l,b), (r,b+l),
(r-l,b), or (r,b-l). When the battle was of considerable
length and transitions between states occurred with con-
siderable frequency, the discrete changes in strength could
be approximated by two simultaneous differential equations
which Marshall derived. His equations were:





£| = -gr + n(b-B).
In these equations, m is the resupply rate for the red side
per unit of red per unit time (similarly for n)
, p is the
attrition rate against r per unit of b per unit time (simi-
larly for q) . Marshall concluded his work by determining
the duration of the battle in the case where m = n, p = q,
and R = B.
A summary article by Wallis [57] discussed several of
the stochastic approaches already mentioned, and attempted
to categorize those situations when such an approach was
reasonable. In his view, there were three general settings
when a stochastic formulation was appropriate. The first
such setting was when there were relatively few units en-
gaged in battle, which was "likely when the battle is bloody".
Secondly, high correlation between losses indicated that a
deterministic formulation of the problem could not give ac-
curate results. Thirdly, modeling the combat stochastically
was suggested when the payoff desired by the decision-maker
was dependent upon the form of the probability distribution
of the survivors.
Wallis praised the stochastic formulation for the free-
dom it permitted in the choice of the probability density
function for each of the attrition coefficients, but cautioned,
as have so many others, that when the deterministic approach
is discarded, it must be remembered that computational
23

difficulties grow rapidly as the sizes of the opposing
forces grow.
The most recent contribution to a stochastic theory of
combat found in the research done for this paper was a 197C
article by Koopman [38] . He pointed out that the analysis
of any combat situation must include consideration of three
essential ingredients: a means of thoroughly describing
the system, an array Which specifies all of the possible
states into which the system may be driven, and a means for
identifying the role played by the military decision-maker
in affecting the transitions from state to state. Koopman
was led to a stochastic formulation of combat by early rec-
ognition of the fact that given a set of input parameters,
seldom will two plays of any battle proceed exactly the same
way. He described combat as a stationary Markov stochastic
process and justified his assumptions in a manner not unlike
authors of earlier articles. In cautioning about the use of
the Markov assumption, he noted that such an assumption is
unjustified in a situation where, when a particular state
(r,b) has been achieved at time t, some factor is still not
completely known and can be better understood by knowledge
of some earlier state of the system. Several methods for
solution of the stochastic equations were described; among
these techniques were separation of variables, Green's func-
tion, infinite series, successive approximations, and approx-
imation by difference equations (replacing continuous time t
by relatively short time periods of length At) . Also outlined
24

in the article were two ways of establishing the relationship
between Lanchester's deterministic equations and the stochastic
Lanchester equations. The first recalled that from a stochas-
tic viewpoint, the strengths of each side at a given instant
are random variables, whereas in the original Lanchester
formulaticn these numbers represented expected values. In
the seconc approach, the differencss in the stochastic for-
mulation could be replaced by their derivative approximations.
In an effort to shed light on the enormity of the calcula-
tions often required in the stochastic analysis, Koopman
noted that the number of states possible for a given system
grows large very rapidly, particularly when it is recognized
that a target must, in general, be detected before it can be
destroyed. Thus, the number of equations which must be writ-
ten down to completely describe the system might be so great
as to deter one from an exploration of a stochastic analysis.
In light of the difficult calculations required by a
general stochastic formulation, Morse and Kimball [43] and
Willard [63] demonstrated that the solution. to the original
deterministic Lanchester equations was analogous to the ex-
pected outcome in a stochastic formulation. They concluded
that a deterministic approach was appropriate. Brooks [11]
argued in favor of stochastic determinism.
D. OPERATIONAL LOSSES, REPLACEMENTS, AND MOVEMENT OF FORCES
Lanchester's original equations described attrition due
to hostile fire only. Non-combat losses were first examined
25

by Morse [42] and subsequently by Bach, e_t. a_l. [2]. The
latter article considered how large an initial strength a
side would need to insure victory, and how a winning side
must act in order to minimize its total losses. To consider












rb R^ " fB(t) '
where k is the operational loss rate for the red side (sim-
ilarly for f) . The condition on initial strength needed tc














which of course simplifies when k = f. It was also shown that
a winner can reduce its total losses by committing to the bat-
tle a greater number of men than the minimum required for vic-







In a manner analogous to that described above except
with the sign of the second term positive instead of negative,




In a 1957 article, Weiss [59] revised the Lanchester
square lau formulation to account for the fact that the rate
at which two sides will lose men is critically dependent on
how far apart the forces are during an engagement. He in-
cluded a term, g(s), which was a function of the force
separation distance. Thus,
§• -AbrB(t)g(s).
If s is the distance of the red force from some reference
r
line, and s, is the distance of ths blue force from the same
line, then s = s -s, . Noting that ds/dt = ds /dt - ds,/dt,
Weiss argued that since movement of each force relative to
the other is affected by the casualties each side has suf-
fered, retreat and advancement could be predicted by his
model. He quite reasonably assumed that each commander has,
generally by order of higher headquarters, a certain casualty
rate he is willing to accept. With this assumption, a com-
parison of observed casualty rates with acceptable rates
would dictate whether or not a force should continue to ad-
vance or begin to retreat.
Gamow and Zimmerman [23] also considered movement of
forces. However, their model did not consider that the at-
trition rate coefficients A, and A , are affected by the
distance which separates the two sides.
A slightly different approach to movement of forces and
range-varying kill rates was made by Bonder [4]. His form
27

of the square law incorporated force separation distance, s,
into the attrition rate coefficient. His equations were:
f -Abr (s)B(t),
and
S = -A . (s)R(t),dt Lrb
indicating the coefficients as functions of s. Noting that
dR dR ds j „_, . ds , ., ,
-rr = -y— ---r , and that -nr- = v, he rewrote the above equations
as :
v§ - -Abr c s ) B (t)
and
41 = -A , (s)R(t).ds rb











dt ' v '
and finally substituting these expressions in the resulting







ds^~ oTJ 7? - Abr (s) oT
[Abr (s)]















where a is the acceleration between forces (so that
dv
dT * v v ) •
Clearly, these two final expressions showed that a relation-
ship exists between casualties and force separation and
movement
.
In the same article, Bonder discussed an armor battle
in which tanks of the blue side attacked a static red position




AK (s) (V s ) >br v Jlbr
where R is the maximum effective range of blue's tanks; i.e.,
A, (s) = if s>R . By letting X = (R -s) 2 and . using chain
L) J. t? t2
rule differentiation, he was able to reduce his second-order
differential attrition equations to a solvable form. The
solutions to these new equations showed that greater mobility
of the attacking tanks reduced their losses in the engagement,
but also reduced the number of hits by the blue tanks on the
static red force.
E. VERIFICATION STUDIES
A great number of authors who have looked at Lanchester's
theory over the years have pointed out that only limited work
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has been done to compare actual casualty data with predictions
made by application of Lanchester's equations. As Dolansky
[18] stated, there is a need for more "...verification studies
in order to establish the validity of Lanchester- type equa-
tions more firmly in more sophisticated situations."
Perhaps the best-known verification study was done by
Engel [19] in 1954, in which he showed that actual casualties
suffered by both the United States and Japan during the seizure
of Iwo Jima compared very favorably with casualty figures as
predicted by Lanchester's equations. (Engel 's mode a. included
a term which allowed for reinforcements.) A similar result
was obtaired by Weiss [59] when he looked at the battles on
several Pacific islands during World War II and concluded that
the use of Lanchester's square law was justified for casualties
on the United States side.
The most exhaustive verification study to date was done
by Willard [63]. It was significant primarily for two rea-
sons. In the first place, Willard looked at more than 1500
land battles which had occurred during the period 1618-1905,
so he certainly had a large sample space from which to draw
his conclusions. Secondly, his skeptical conclusions about
the applicability of Lanchester's equations were startling.
Willard placed every battle in one of two categories, meeting
engagements or attacks on fortified positions. His results
demonstrated that while data from attacks on fortified posi-
tions showed a higher correlation to Lanchester's predictions
than did the data from meeting engagements, in neither case
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was the correlation strong enough to allow one to conclude
that Lanch.ester ' s equations accurately describe attrition in
combat. In his view, the accuracy of Lanchester's equations
deteriorated rapidly as the size of the initial forces on
each side increased, until, for very large battles, Lanchester's
approach simply could not be used. Willard further concluded
from his in-depth study that in a fight to the finish, a win-
ner could not be predicted by examination of the initial fcrce
ratio. While this opinion contrasted sharply with the work
of many others, Helmbold [28] supported Willard' s claim in
a study of 92 land battles done in 1961. While Helmbold was
uncertain about the full range of factors which led to vic-
tory on the battlefield, he was convinced at least that
numerical superiority was not the only such factor. From
Lanchester's square law, Helmbold estimated the ratio of
attrition coefficients, A, /A , , from the data he had, and
' br rb
'
plotted In A, /A , versus In R /B . This scatter diagram in-v br' rb o' o to
dicated the existence of a linear regression. He let V = In u
(where u 2 ' = A, R 2 /A . B 2 ) , since a linear relation betweenv br o rb o J '
In Au /A , and In R /B will maintain itself as a linear re-br rb o o
lation between V and In R /B . Utilizing the techniques ofoo
linear regression, he determined the regression equation to
be V = b+cln R /B , where b and c are constants. He went on
o o
'
to show that V was an index of the blue side's probability
of winning. More importantly, his research indicated that
Au /A . was positively correlated with R /B , rather thanbr rb F } o o'
negatively correlated as one would expect if numerical supe-
riority in a battle was an indicator of victory.
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A verification analysis which looked at battles of the
U. S. Civil War was made by Weiss [58]. As Willard had done
before him, he separated the battles into two categories.
He termed the first category "assaults on fortified lines"
and grouped all remaining confrontations under the heading
of "other battles". Before a discussion of the results of
the Weiss study, the implications of Lanchester's original
formulations are deserving of mention. Under Lanchester's
linear law, the casualty rate was not dependent upon initial
force ratio, while under the square law the casualty rate
was inversely proportional to the force ratio. For the
battles which could be classified as attacks on fortified
positions, Weiss showed that the attackers' losses were
directly proportional to the number of defenders trying to
repel the attack, but that wide battle-to-battle variability
existed in casualty ratios. He further concluded that the
probability of the attackers winning the battle increased as
the ratio of attackers to defenders increased.
In the category of "other battles", into which 28 of the
Civil War encounters were placed, Weiss was noncommital about
the dependence (or lack thereof) of casualty ratios on force
ratios. He could not prove such dependence, but nor could he
disprove it. To be an effective prediction device, he con-
cluded that any combat model must be "... based on the ability
to continue fighting as a function of sustained fractional
losses." He developed such a model for the probability of
winning. The formulation of this model indicated that the
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initial force ratio was a strong determinant of which side
would win. For the battles which lie examined, casualty
ratios were shown to be independent of which side attacked.
In general, the losing side suffered 15 percent casualties
as compared with 12 percent on the winning side.
A recent study which looked at historical data from
Korea was based on the most complete information of any such
study to date [22]. The authors, Fain, e_t. aJU , were equipped
with the following data on a daily basis from each of three
battles: the amount of close air support, the amounts
of heavy and light artillery, the friendly and enemy strengths,
the friendly and enemy casualties, and the relative movement
of the foward edge of the battle area. In their model, the
tactical warfare simulation program, they used two methods
for computing kill rates. In the empirical method, kill rates
were derived from an analysis of known engagement times,
strengths, and casualties suffered. In the theoretical
method, attrition was calculated from a term called the index
of firepower potential, which measured the ability of a unit
to inflict casualties on its opponents. It was assumed in
the model that casualty production took the form described
by Lanchester's equations; that is, for close combat, losses
on each side were proportional to the strength of the oppo-
sition, and for fire support, losses on the side receiving
the fire were proportional to the product of the strengths
of each side. The authors recognized the dependence of casualty
production upon weapon composition, ammunition expenditure rates
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and the positioning of the forces of the target unit. For
each of the three battles studied, the fit was good for both
the empirical and the theoretical approaches, with the em-
pirical method consistently giving better results. For ex-
ample, for the Seoul- Inchon landing (15 September through
30 October 1950), actual casualties were 2534 and 19,142
for the Allies and the North Koreans, respectively. The em-
pirical method yielded results of 2507 and 19,370, while the
theoretical method computed losses of 2401- and 18,072. As
should be clear from these figures, the article concluded
that Lanchester ' s theory for prediction of casualties was
valid for the data examined.
Additional verification studies using data from Korea
have been made by Overholt [44] in which it was determined
that Lanchester ' s equations worked well for predicting los5.es
on the Chinese communist side, but not so well for United
States' casualties. At the time of this writing, Overholt
[44] and Low [40] were examining the applicability of
Lanchester's equations to data from the war. in Vietnam.
F. INSURGENCY AND GUERRILLA WARFARE
In the years since the end of the Korean War, consider-
able effort has been undertaken by military planners to come
up with a suitable strategy for combating insurgency and
guerrilla warfare. Many have felt that this type conflict
will dominate the scene for many years to come. Thus, it
seems suitable at this point to examine the work which has
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been done in applying Lanchester ' s equations to this special
type of warfare.
Early efforts by Deitchman [17] to model guerrilla war-
fare deterministically are well known. A more recent in-
surgency model was developed by Shaffer [50]. He derived
deterministic forms of Lanchester' s equations for each of
three types of encounter: the skirmish, the ambush, and the
siege. He considered a large number of small (100-man)
forces operating in an area. Neither side could receive
reinforcements. Both sides had supporting weapons; the in-
surgents support came from small, portable weapons such as
mortars and recoilless rifles, while the counterinsurgents
had, in addition, ground- attack aircraft. The equations
Shaffer derived were identical to Lanchester's original
square law formulation except that each force was also re-
duced in size by the effects of the supporting weapons of
its opponents. Thus, each equation contained the term
- ? E. (t)W.
,l i v J l '
where W. is the number of supporting weapons of type i which
the side has, and E-(t) is the effectiveness of one weapon
of type i at time t. Because surrenders and desertions are
common in insurgencies, Shaffer derived differential equa-
tions which permitted a commander to predict the losses each
side would suffer from those sources. For the skirmish,
where each side maneuvers against the other and surprise is
not a factor, Shaffer considered the terms E. and E- as
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constants. He then obtained a numerical solution to his
revised equations on a computer. For the ambush, it was
recognized that the force being ambushed reduced its ex-
posure in time and thus also reduced the effectiveness of
the ambushers' weapons. He obtained numerical solutions to
the ambush equations which showed that the attacker would
win, even though outnumbered by those he was ambushing, be-
cause of the initial cover advantage he possessed. Modelirg
of the siege (attack on a fortified position such as a
strategic hamlet) required some modification. The siege is
generally preceeded by an artillery and air preparation.
Thus, in the model, Lanchester's linear law was applicable
for that phase since the riflemen did not fire their weapons
(out of range). During the assault phase, the square law
was again applicable. Shaffer's assault phase in the siege
model was identical (in the absence of defensive artillery
support) to the model for fixed area 'defense developed ear-
lier by Brackney [9]. Shaffer's solution for the assault
phase was- independent of time.
Subsequent research done by Shaffer [51] on guerrilla
warfare included a development of additional models for
skirmishes, ambushes, and sieges which were unique in that
they used weapon efficiency coefficients which were time-
dependent. While these models could not be used to predict
a winner, they were valuable because they permitted critical
analysis of casualty claims. He showed that in any guerrilla
operation, morale and the state of discipline are important
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determinants of how long a battle will last, who will win it,
and the rate at which casualties will be inflicted. It was
demonstrated for the skirmish that the time selected for the
introduction of supporting weapons was critical. For am-
bushes, Shaffer predicted success against an opponent twice
as large as oneself. In preparing for a siege, it was sho\\n
that a coriimander must weigh the pros and cons of using pre-
paratory fires. If he used them, they were of assistance in
"softening up" the enemy, but the effects of the element of
surprise v/ere thereby severely diminished, if not lost.
Shaffer developed descriptive equations which could be used
by the commander of the attacking force to help him decide
whether or not to employ these preparatory fires.
In 1966, Kisi and Ilirose [36] reformulated Deitchman's
Lanchester- type model of guerrilla warfare in stochastic form
They considered a blue force of guerrillas waiting to ambush
an approaching red force of regulars! When the blue force
began firing, all the red force was in full view. On the
other hand, at the start of the engagement ,. the red force
could only fire into the area it suspected the guerrillas
occupied. The authors considered a stochastic formulation
of the problem to be appropriate because of the small number
of combatants on the guerrilla side. The results of their
research were formulas for determining the probability of
winning, both exactly and approximately. In their deriva-
tion, p(r,b) was the probability that the red side wins and
q(r,b) was the probability that the blue side wins (in the
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exact derivation, these two quantities were assumed to sum
to one) . The time between shots fired by the guerrillas was
taken to be exponentially distributed with mean 1/A. The
time between successive firings by the regulars had the same
distribution with mean 1/A. The regulars' fire was uniformly
distributed over an area, A, and A was taken as the effec-
' ' e
tive lethal area of a single shot, while r* and b* were the
strengths which, when reached, would cause a side to dis-














By dropping the assumption that p(r,b) + q(r,b) = 1, an










To demonstrate the goodness of their approximation, Kisi and
Hirose showed that for a = 500 and r* = b* = 0, the exact
value for p(100,100) was 0.5460, while the approximation yield-
ed a result of 0.542, an error of less than one percent.
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G. THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING
Any commander would certainly welcome information about
his chances of success prior to the start of any battle.
Accordingly, the concept of the probability of winning has
received considerable attention over the years by many who
have looked at Lanchester's equations. Three efforts in
this area have already been discussed in other contexts;
specifically, Kisi and Hirose [36] in guerrilla warfare,
Brown [12] in a stochastic formulation of combat and
Helmbold [31] in his verification study (see above). A
fresh look at the probability of winning was an extension
of the work of Brackney [9] and Brown [13] which was done
by Smith [52]. Brackney had described nine possible combat
situations which could come about when two sides faced each,
other. Brown's work resulted in a recurrence formula that
could be used to evaluate the probability of winning in five
of these nine situations. Using the' same assumptions that
had been made by Brown, Smith was able to generate the prob-
ability distribution of the number of survivors of each
side for all nine possible situations. From these dis-
tributions he determined by use of the calculus of finite
differences, the probability that a given side would win.
Additionally, he derived formulas for computing the prob-
ability that a given number of the red force would be alive
when the blue force was annihilated (and vice versa) from
knowledge of the initial strengths of each side.
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H. DUELS AND INDIRECT FIRE
In an extensive summary article on mathematical models
which describe combat, Bonder [5] showed that the original
Lanchester linear law describes two tactical situations
:
the duel and indirect fire into an area where one's enemy
cannot be precisely located. His solution to the simul-
taneous differential equations which describe these two forms
of conflict was simple and permitted rapid calculation of
r(t) and b(t), the number of survivors on either side at
time t, given initial strengths and the values of A, and A ,.
> t> b br rb
A stochastic treatment of the duel was recently made
by Hellman [25]. In his model he considered combat as a
series of individual duels, comprising a process which is
neither stationary nor Markovian. He hypothesized that the
starting time of duels was a Poisson process with rate A .
The duration of a given duel was a random variable whose
distribution might take on any of several forms (in his ex-
ample the exponential distribution was assumed) . He assumed
that the termination of a duel occurred when one. or both
the parties involved were killed. Using basic probability
theory he then developed probabilities of winning for each
side and probabilities that there were r and b survivors
on each side at time t.
I. THE ROLE OF COMMAND EFFICIENCY AND INTELLIGENCE
Success in combat is, of course, determined by several
factors which the original Lanchester equations either did
not consider or erroneously assumed to be the same from
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battle to battle. Among these factors are the value of good
intelligence and the efficiency of the command. A very simple
model which incorporated these two broad categories was de-
veloped by Schreiber [49], in which his assumptions closely
paralleled the rather primitive ones made by Lanchester.
The important difference considered by Schreiber was that he
permitted each side during a battle to receive through its
intelligence system information on the results of its fire
against its opponents. With the use of this information,
the command and control system of the unit could then order
the subsequent fire to be redirected such that it was con-
tinually uniformly distributed over the surviving members
of the other side. Clearly, the better the intelligence,
the less fire would be wasted. Schreiber measured the ef-
fectiveness of the intelligence and command and control
system by a term referred to as command efficiency (CE) , and
defined as "the fraction of the enemy's destroyed units from
which fire has been redirected." A perfect system then was
one in which CE = 1 , while the worst case (most. fire wasted)




dt [r -CE, (r -r)] '
L o bo J J
dB ArbR(t)B(t)
dT [b -CE (b -b)]L o r o J J
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Note that when CE = (no information) , area fire resulted
and when CE = 1 (total information) , the situation was iden-
tical with aimed fire. The above equations have limited ap-
plicability because Schreiber assumed that each side remained
stationary throughout the battle and because he assumed com-
mand efficiency does not diminish, as it must as each side
suffers casualties. Nevertheless, Schreiber' s results were
important because they showed that a unit's fighting capa-
bility can be greatly influenced by the worth of its intel-
ligence ard command and control systems.
J. THE ATTRITION COEFFICIENTS
As has been pointed out earlier, the attrition rate,
A, , is the constant rate at which a single blue unit killsbr
'
b
red units. These coefficients are seldom easy to determine,
for as Bonder [5] said, there is no way of "... predicting
the attrition coefficients ... as a function of a weapon sys-
tem' s capabilities...." As mentioned by Peterson [45], most
models specify A, and A , as functions of the rate of fire
*\ ; br rb
of one side and the exposed area of targets of the other side
(area fire) or of rate of fire and single shot kill probability
(aimed fire). While Bonder [6] was unable to predict these
coefficients, he did derive a probability distribution of
attrition rate for weapons which were able to adjust their
fire based on feedback information on the results of previous-
ly fired rounds. In this work, Bonder considered average at-
trition as equivalent to the arithmetic mean of a set of
attrition rates. His use of an arithmetic mean was later
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challenged by Barfoot [3] who attempted to justify the use
of the harmonic mean instead. (Bonder [7] subsequently pub-
lished another article demonstrating that he and Barfoot
were really saying the same thing.) Barfoot' s model did have,
however, more general applicability than did Bonder's model.
Bonder had considered a case where a weapon system had only
three different hit probabilities and one conditional prob-
ability of a kill, whereas Barfoot permitted m different
hit and kill probabilities for each weapon.
A computer method of solving the Lanchester- type dif-
ferential equations was obtained by Dashiell and Fain [16].
In their study, A, and A , were not considered continuous.1
' br rb
but rather "temporarily constant" so that each could be
viewed as a step function, constant for some short time
interval of length At. The values of A, and A , at the
to b r rb
start of any new time interval were considered to be determined
solely by the state of the battle at the end of the previous
time interval. When either of the two coefficients changed in
the tactical warfare simulation program which Dashiell and
Fain used, that signalled the end of one time interval and the
beginning of another. Their program determined values for A,
and A , and also computed lengths of time over which the co-
efficients so determined could be considered as constant.
With this background, Dashiell and Fain derived a series
of ordinary differential equations for describing combat
attrition. The excessive computer time necessary to solve
these equations led the authors tc an approximation by the




AB J a -A u R^At . ,rb j '
and
AR 3 a -A, B J At.
,br 3 '
where B 3 , for example, is the number of blue survivors at
the start of the j time period, and At. is the length of
the j time period. In their model, At. was taken to be
"... the time period between changes in the engagement status
of any unit, or one hour, whichever comes first." (Addi-
tional work on this tactical warfare simulation program was
reported by Fain, Fair, and Karr [21].)
K. ENGAGEMENTS PRECEEDED BY SEARCH AND DETECTION
All the studies examined thusfar modeled warfare which
began when one side initiated fire against its opponent.
However, since combat cannot begin until one force is de-
tected by another, a model which considers the search and
reconnaissance aspects of a battle can provide valuable in-
formation' to a commander. The work of Brackney [9] was a
significant contribution to many offshoots of Lanchester's
theory, and his paper has been discussed by several authors
in recent years. To avoid repetition of the results of re-
search done by others, only Brackney 's ideas on search will
be discussed here. As was mentioned briefly earlier in this
paper, he identified nine possible combat situations which
could arise on the battlefield, depending upon the posture
(attack, constant area defense, and constant density defense)
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of each force. He defined T (the time required by the red
force to lire its weapons) to be the sum of two quantities,
T and T ,- , where T is the time required for the red
rs rf rs n
force to search for and detect the blue force, and T £ is
' rf
the elapsed time between finding the enemy and firing at
him. He c.ssumed that detection time for the red force was
inversely proportional to the density of the blue targets,
or that T = k A, /b, -where A, is the area the blue forceis r b ' b
occupies and k is a proportionality constant (a similar ex-
pression was specified for T, ). With this background,
Brackney described combat (under conditions where search was
















He then examined several special cases from which he con-
cluded that when T >>T «.
,
the square law applied and a de-
fensive posture should be assumed by the blue force, and
when T <<T ,., the linear law applied and an attack posture
was indicated for the blue force. This showed that the
linear law could sometimes be used even for aimed fire.
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L. FOLLOWING DOLANSKY'S SUGGESTIONS
At the end of his article, Dolansky [18] identified
several problems for future research. Among these was the
task of "development of outcome-predicting relations that
use only information pertaining to friendly units, in the
heterogeneous cases." In a recent work, Buell, e_t. a_l. [14]
described how one might compute approximate values for
enemy strength and enemy replacement rates of men and materi-
el from information about one's own side alone. The authors
began with three differential equations of attrition. The
first equation described enemy attrition in terms of friendly
strengths and enemy replacement r^.tes, while the second and
third equations described attrition of friendly direct fire
and indirect fire weapons, respectively. Using arbitrary
initial conditions, these equations were then integrated to
yield time histories of friendly forces. To determine time
histories of enemy strengths and replacement rates, the pro-
cess of quasilinearization (a quadratically converging suc-
cessive approximation scheme) was used. Arbitrary but
reasonable values were chosen for dR/dt and c (replacement
rate) . The next step involved linearization of the three
Lanchester equations by expanding their right-hand sides in
power series about the values selected arbitrarily, and re-
taining only the linear terms. Taking the duration of a
battle to be unity, particular and complementary solutions
to these linearized equations were then computed numerically
on the interval zero to one. A constant multiplier of the
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complementary solutions was also calculated. Four quantities
were solved for by this method: enemy strength, enemy re-
placement rate, and two friendly strengths (direct and in-
direct fire weapon strengths) . The process was repeated
with new choices for the enemy figures until such time as
the values computed by this procedure for the friendly
strengths were close enough to the actual, observed friendly
strengths. That solution which gave the best fit between
friendly strengths (calculated versus observed) was then
taken as the correct solution for enemy strength and re-
placement rate.
Dolansky also recommended that further study be under-
taken in the area of "...optimum target assignment problems,
using the differential-game theory approach." He referred
to an effort by Isbell and Marlow [34] which dealt with the
fire distribution problem by using a terminal control (one-
sided) differential game. Their setting had a homogeneous
red force opposed by a heterogeneous blue force of, for ex-
ample, riflemen and machine gunners. The red commander's
problem was to determine what proportion of his fire to
allocate to each type weapon on the blue side. Isbell and
Marlow did not completely solve this problem. The con-
ditions under which the various terminal states of combat
are reached were not determined. A complete solution to
the problem has been derived by Taylor [54].
In an unpublished paper, Taylor [56] has used the theory
of optimal control to establish that the form of attrition
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process under consideration, the conditions which signalled
the end of a battle, and the level of command efficiency of
the combatants had a strong influence on the "tactics for
target selection."
M. SMALL COMBAT GROUPS AND WEAPONS WITH GREAT EFFECTIVENESS
In contrast to the large-scale battles considered by
many authors in testing the applicability of Lanchester's
equations, Weiss [59] modeled a conflict consisting of a
series of battles between relatively small groups of comba-
tants. He assumed that the commander of the red side divided
his force into several equally-numbered groups of size m
(similarly for the blue side with groups of size m, ) . When
two groups met in battle, they fought until one side was
annihilated. The survivors on the winning side were then
reinforced up to full size again to seek out battle with











Notice that these equations reduced to the linear law when
m = m, = 1 , and to the square law when m = R and m, = B
.
r b ' l r b
An extension by Weiss in the same article produced at-
trition equations for the circumstances under which each
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side possessed air-deliverable weapons with devastating power
He assumed such weapons produced casualties proportional to
the number of men in the group against which the weapon was
delivered. Letting X
R
and XR be the number of high-yield
weapons being used by the red and blue sides respectively,
and letting k , and k, be the attrition coefficients forb rb br
these weapons, the equations derived were:
dR
.
. *br B Ct)RCt)







dt m, k , X murb r b
N. FORCE SIZES GROSSLY UNEQUAL
One of the assumptions of the original Lanchester square
law attrition model was that the rate at which casualties are
produced is independent of the relative size of the two for-
ces. Helmbold [26] took issue with this assumption by ad-
vancing the idea that if one force outnumbered the other by
a considerable margin, say 40 or 50 to 1, it was unreasonable
to assume" that the larger force could bring all of its po-
tential combat power to bear on its smaller enemy. He there-
fore suggested an alternative set of differential equations













where g and h are functions which adjust the coefficients
A, and A , under gross force size differences (g(l) = h(l)
so that the square law resulted where R and B were approxi-
mately equal). As an example, Helmbold let z = R(t)/B(t)
and assumed h = z
,
where c is a constant. He then solved
the resulting differential equations and showed that they
reduced tc the square law with c = 0, and to the linear law





Early in this paper it was pointed out that Lanchester's
description of combat was based on several simplifying as-
sumptions. Weapon systems and tactics are so sophisticated
and diverse today that Lanchester's original model cannot
stand alone as a predictive tool for the analysis of ground
combat because some of these assumptions (such as assuming
homogeneous forces are facing each other) are no longer
valid. Nevertheless, Lanchester's efforts represented a
significant contribution to military operations research.
The theory, with its revisions and extensions, has added a
new dimension to the military decision maker's thought pro-
cess. Without Lanchester's theory a commander makes deci-
sions in combat by applying the principles of war (see
Conolly, R. L., "The Principles of War," Proc. U. S. Naval
Institute
,
Vol. 79, No. 1, p. 1-9 (1953)) and the tactical
expertise- he has gained through schooling and experience.
Lanchester's theory may aid the military leader in at least
three specific areas. First, it may provide a quantitative
basis for some of the principles of war. For example, the
principle of mass dictates that a commander concentrate the
bulk of his forces at the decisive time and place in any bat-
tle. Lanchester demonstrated the advantages of concentration
of forces in modern non-nuclear warfare. Secondly, the ideas
conveyed by the principles of war may be supplemented by ad-
ditional information gained from application of Lanchester's
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theory, information predicting chances of success and ex-
pected outcomes of alternative courses of action. Thirdly,
Lanchester ' s theory may provide insight into the dynamics
of combat j how and why conditions may be expected to change
in time on the battlefield.
No attempt was made at a critical analysis of the numer-
ous ideas cited herein. This thesis was intended solely tc
array for the interested analyst the recent efforts that have
been made in the modeling of combat with Lanchester 1 s theory.
The future will doubtless bring new and more wide-
ranging studies in Lanchester's theory. It is hoped that
efforts will be directed in the following areas:
1. Verification studies using data from the war in
Southeast Asia, such as those now being conducted by Low and
Overholt
.
2. Studies designed to determine the minimum force that
can be expected to adequately accomplish a given mission.
Work in this area should be initiated as rapidly as possible
in view of the anticipated reductions in the size of our
armed forces.
3. The development of less cumbersome solution techniques
for the stochastic formulation of combat, and an expansion of
the stochastic formulation to account for the wide variety of
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